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‘Love-Jihad’ and Bollywood: Constructing Muslims as ‘Other’
Abstract

In the postcolonial nation state that is India, cinema has become an important tool for propagating the idea of
nationalism. In recent times, one of the most controversial components of Hindu nationalism has been the
hate campaign against what is termed as ‘love-jihad’, which is deployed as a weapon to mobilize, polarize, and
communalize citizens. The Indian Hindi-language film industry, popularly known as Bollywood, has also
become a controversial site. In this paper, I argue that if ‘Indian nationalism’ is to be represented as ‘Hindu
nationalism’ and ‘Indian culture’ as ‘Hindu culture,’ it logically follows that this majoritarian construction
needs the minority ‘Other’ to reinforce this notion of nationalism and culture. To make my point, I shall
critically look at the representation of Muslims in contemporary Bollywood films. My analysis deploys
Edward Said’s notion of representation and knowledge as imbricated in issues of power, class, and materiality.
Using Said’s theoretical framework of Orientalism, this paper elucidates how specific popular Bollywood films
in the historical genre have dealt with the liminality of the Muslim ‘Other’ in the nation-space by either
representing Muslims in stereotypical ways or by vilifying their image. This paper adopts the textual analysis
method (that is, it reads the films as texts). I posit that the representation of Muslims in Bollywood films could
be divided into two broad segments: representation of Muslims in the context of ‘love-jihad’ and the effect of
‘love-jihad’ on Bollywood.
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Bollywood1 has become one of the most important platforms for the cultural
production of narratives in South Asia. As the dominant media outlet, it plays a
crucial role in projecting certain ideological discourses such as nationalism,
communalism, and secularism. Hindi 2 films, just as other films, construct an
imaginary notion of the past in the light of the contemporary socio-political
situation. Therefore, that Islam has played an important role in contemporary Indian
religious politics has also been reflected in Indian cinema in the last two decades.
One of the most controversial contemporary issues of religious politics is ‘lovejihad’ 3 and its impact is quite evident in Bollywood. This paper explores the
depiction of women and Muslims in the complex representational scheme and in
the reception of two films, Jodhaa Akbar4 and Padmaavat,5 and looks at them as
being products of complex historical, cultural, and political nation-building projects
in which gender plays a central role. First and foremost, we need to understand the
connection between gender and Hindu nationalist discourse.

Gendering the Politics of Hindu Nationalism
Gender became a very important component of the nationalist discourse
from the colonial period. Depending on the nation’s political scenario, gender,
especially that of women, has been used as a tool to strengthen the nationalist
political discourse since the time of the anti-colonial movement. Sometimes the
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image and ‘plight’ of women are used to awaken the collective conscience of the
nation, while at other times it is made a tool for gaining political power.

Locating Nationalism and the Position of Women
Before discussing the term ‘nationalism’ we need to understand the concept
of the ‘nation.’ A ‘nation’ is defined by political geographic boundaries. Kelly J.
Bell opined that ‘Nationalism’ is the belief that focuses on the ongoing support for
that geographical boundary, and people visualize the boundary to be separated from
the other nations of the world.6 According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the
definition of nationalism is “loyalty and devotion to a nation; especially a sense of
national consciousness … exalting one nation above all others and placing primary
emphasis on promotion of its culture and interests as opposed to those of other
nations or supranational groups.” 7 Bell further mentioned, “Nationalism is an
ideology that focuses both on loyalty to and pride in one’s nation…. Nationalism,
at its core, instills a belief in citizens that their country is important and superior to
other countries, and their individual identity is strongly tied to their homeland.”8
During colonial rule in India, nationalism became an important ideology used to
motivate and instigate people for the cause of freedom.
In the colonialist and nationalist discourses, women directly or indirectly
played an important role. The subaltern position of Indian women enabled the
British to justify imperialism as a ‘civilizing mission’ in which they were rescuing
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Indian women from the reprehensible practices of a traditional Hindu patriarchal
society. We must also reflect upon the historical details of the manner in which the
‘civilizing mission’ came to be determined. The ‘woman question’ in the agenda of
social reform in the early 19th century was not much about the specific condition of
women within a determinate set of social relations. Lata Mani rightly pointed out
in her study of abolition of sati-daha,9 that even later, the agenda of the ‘woman
question’ was produced by post colonialist discourses.10
In connection to that, nationalism was not only a political struggle of power,
rather, it related to the question of the political independence of a nation in virtually
every aspect of the material and spiritual lives of its citizens. Partha Chatterjee, a
prominent post-colonial theorist, provided a theoretical framework11 for analyzing
the contradictory pulls on nationalist ideology in its struggle against dominant
colonialism and the resolution it offered to those contradictions. In brief, this
resolution was built around a splitting of the domain of culture into two spheres—
the material and the spiritual. Within the material sphere may be included the claims
of Western civilization that its culture was superior and most powerful because of
its reliance on science, technology, rational forms of economic organization, and
modern methods of statecraft. It was believed that these had given the European
countries the strength to subjugate non-European people. To overcome this
domination, the colonized people of India had to imitate the Western material
aspect of life; however, it was assumed that Indians did not have to rely on the
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Western spiritual sphere as the spiritual domain of the East was superior to that of
the West. Nationalists asserted that European powers failed to colonize the inner,
that is, superior spiritual culture of the colonized. This in turn led to the ascribing
of gender roles in our society. Material interest in the outer world was thought to
be the masculine realm of society, and the inner world, that is, the spiritual, was
considered to be the feminine domain.
As women were thought to be situated in the sacred spiritual space, thus,
during the anti-colonial period, it was easier to make people imagine that gender,
especially womanhood, was of primary importance in the embodiment of the
nation. Consequently, women have been used as a symbol of national identity from
the time of India’s freedom movement. The fact that national identity was
constructed in gendered terms is apparent in the use of feminine nouns to address
the nation, such as ‘she’ or ‘motherland’ to refer to the country. The most ideal
image of the country was as Mother India, depicted as a goddess modestly dressed
in a sari, seated on a lion, and holding a saffron flag.12
It is argued by numerous scholars such as Sikata Banerjee,13 Kelly J. Bell,14
and Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi15 that religious politics created a space for
women to participate in the political discourse during the pre-Independence days.
It can also be argued that Hindu women are represented as the “repositories of the
religious beliefs and the keepers of purity and integrity of the Hindu community.”16
If it is true that religious politics has created opportunities for women to become a
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part of the public space, it can equally be argued that it has simultaneously
undermined women’s autonomy 17 ; the identity of women has been reduced to
‘mother,’ ‘daughter,’ and ‘sister,’ whose honour should be protected by the male
members of the community. Also, it should be mentioned that only a small
percentage of women got the opportunity to participate in the nation’s political
discourse. Thus, we see that Hindu nationalist discourse legitimizes the dominance
of men over women.
We must focus on another perspective to understand gender roles in the
nationalist discourse. Initially, nationalism and its ideas gained popularity among
the elite but it needed mass support for its wider propagation. Historically, ideals
of nationalism were inclusive of various religions, races, and languages; later,
however, nationalism drew on the idea of unification of diverse groups to form a
new community of citizens. According to historian Romila Thapar, there were, and
are, nationalist ideologies where an individual group identity is prioritized as
opposed to a secular nationalist discourse. For example, there are concepts of
nations based on a single exclusive identity: religious, linguistic, ethnic and similar
singular identities. Prominent historian Romila Thapar has christened this
phenomenon as ‘pseudo-nationalism’ which exaggerates the importance of a single
history of one religious community as being the pre-eminent history of the nation
and which denigrates and distorts the history of other communities. She went
further to suggest that such ideals “should be precluded from being called
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nationalism.”18 We can also argue, women only find a place as tools in the hands
of men. In essence women, as subjects, are excluded from the concept of
nationalism except as being carriers of abstract notions of honour. In this respect
their exclusion can be compared to the way in which Muslims as ‘Others’ are
excluded from the project of nationalism.
In the post-Independence period, India experienced Partition and many
communal riots across the country. Those historical traumas, such as the violence
of Partition, experiences of permanent exile, and sufferings due to communal
violence heightened the feeling for non-Muslims of being threatened by Muslims
during the traumatic events of 1947. The identity of the Muslim ‘Other’ gained
ground during British rule due to the colonial policy of divide and rule and later
due to the partitioning of India and the creation of Pakistan. Moreover, the
vilification of Muslim rulers in India originated during colonial times through the
writings of British historians. The notion of ‘Otherness’ has become more
complicated in the last two decades after the demolition of the Babri Masjid in the
country. In connection to this, Thapar has also pointed out that a version of history
is currently being written by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangha [RSS] 19 and
Hindutva ideologues for whom the past has only to do with Hindu history of the
early period and the victimization of Hindus under Muslim tyranny in the medieval
period. During the 1990s, the narrative of communal violence began to be reframed
in terms of allegations of the abductions of Hindu women by Muslim men during
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Partition. This approach was adopted and became the central theme because
protecting the honour of Hindu women served as an important tool to mobilize
citizens.
“At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the Hindu rightwing groups effectively launched various campaigns to mobilize and gain popular
support; a support that was primarily garnered through anti-Muslim propaganda.”20
At that time, the most successful of these campaigns was the Ayodhya movement.21
Along with communal mobilization, the new emerging political discourse, i.e.
Hindutva, also justified the inferior situation of women in the patriarchal system.
As a result, Hindutva politics tried to justify the sati22 of Roop Kanwar23 in 1987
by seeking justification for the act of sati in religious Hindu scriptures and by
idealizing a woman’s role as a dutiful wife. Hindu nationalist discourse teaches
women to accept the ideals of traditional gender hierarchy. It is believed that “if
women do not perform their cultural role in a proper manner, then the family suffers
and then the nation.” 24 Therefore, if someone dares defy the representation of
women as presented under patriarchy, it is assumed as a disregard for the Hindu
woman and the person is believed to be the enemy of the family and, by extension,
the nation. Hindutva ideology thus inspires Hindu women to think not in terms of
individual rights but rather in terms of collective interest in order to form the ideal
nation, most specifically, a Hindu nation. “The gender ideology of Hindutva, a
factor that touches the very essence of Hindu nationalism, reinforces the
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‘supremacy of the family over the individual’ with the implication that ‘family
considerations should reign supreme,’ not only in marriage, but in ‘career’.”25 This
entire concept was reinforced by deploying the image of Hindu goddesses to
promote the ideal of the Indian female by appealing to religious sentimentality.
Sita’s26 chastity was one of the most popular stories which was referenced multiple
times by the RSS.
As already discussed, nationalism refers to the feeling of oneness or unity.
There can be different kinds of threats which try to break the feeling of oneness or
being united. This threat can either be in the form of physical violence against
national borders or in the form of psychological violence perpetrated by challenging
the normative values or the gender status quo of the nation state. Just as the threats
can break down the feeling of oneness, they can also help in creating a bond within
the community to counter the enemy. Following this point, I argue that the fear of
psychological violence is instilled in people to strengthen the feeling of oneness,
and the female body is utilized as a component to generate that threat. One of the
most controversial campaigns that creates such fear is ‘love-jihad’. As we have
seen that women become active agents in propagating the feeling of nationalism, in
the next section, I will discuss the concept of how the divine feminine should be
protected by the male members of our society from being threatened by ‘Others.’
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Imagining the ‘Divine Feminine’ and the Historical ‘Other’
The female body as a social construct has been shaped by the colonial
discourse of strategic retreats, resistances, and collusions between the colonizer and
the colonized. The imagination of the nation symbolized by the Hindu female body
can be traced back to colonial discourses. Scholars such as Asish Nandy,27 Partha
Chatterjee, 28 Sumathi Ramaswamy, 29 and Charu Gupta 30 have referred to the
centrality of the symbolic feminine in the imagination of the Indian nation. Women
became the only inspiration to maintain ethnic identities, “demarcating the
distinction between the alien and the autochthonal through what their wombs
brought forth.”31 This discourse imposed “a unique cultural responsibility on the
Hindu woman, recognizing her as the repository of past freedom and the future
nationhood.”32 Righteous Hindu women started to symbolize the nation and the
community from the colonial period. During the anti-colonial movement, the
nascent nation state was considered a physical entity, i.e. Bharat Maa,33 as mother,
woman, and goddess.34 Mythological goddesses such as Sati,35 Savitri,36 and Sita
became the inspiration of the ideal devotional wife committed to virtue and
conformity. To emphasize Indian values and ethos during the colonial period, a
nonsexual image of women was presented. Depicted mostly as the “virtuous,
chaste, submissive, self-sacrificing Hindu woman,” she was “the manager of this
hearth [and] came to symbolize the incorruptible abode of the nascent nation, ‘who
had to preserve the Hindu family because the [Hindu] male had already succumbed
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to western colonial power in the material realm’.”37 According to Charu Gupta,
Hindi literature also went through a gradual shift, from “the erotic Radha of
medieval poetry to the chaste and virtuous wife and mother extremely restrained
and bound by propriety.”38 As the woman’s body came to be used symbolically as
the nation, it was supposed to be protected from outsiders or the ‘Other’ by the male
members of the community. M.A. Mubarki writes, “When the woman’s body came
to represent the nation it became out of bounds for the ‘Other’.”39 He further argues,
Women’s bodies [were] deemed the repositories of men’s honour,
the community’s morality, and the nation’s territorial integrity,
which were subjected to brutal violence both sexual and otherwise,
since as a symbol of lineage and purity, women’s bodies once
violated sexually would purportedly designate the entire collectivity
as dishonoured and shamed.40
Though the identification of Hindu women with the nation’s honour is an early
nationalist concept, it achieved unprecedented significance only after the rise of
Hindu nationalist politics. As Hindutva ideology supposes that women have to be
protected by the male members of society, the ‘love-jihad’ campaign became an
important tool to propagate that line of thought.

‘Love-jihad’ and Hindu Nationalism
In recent times, one of the most controversial issues of Hindu nationalism
has been ‘love-jihad’. There is a “fake claim by the Hindu right that there is a ‘Love
Jihad’ organization which is forcing Hindu women to convert to Islam through
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false expressions of love.”41 The propaganda that has been disseminated is that
some Islamic fundamentalist organizations are funding young Muslim boys so that
they are able to trap non-Muslim girls to marry them and thus force them to convert
to Islam. This belief is popularized by organizations such as the RSS, Vishwa Hindu
Parishad [VHP], Sri Ram Sena, Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad, and Hindu
Janjagruthi Samiti. These organisations also utilised the horrifying memories of the
partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the formation of Pakistan and the
accompanying brutal violence between Hindu and Muslim communities. They tried
to instil fear through the propagation of stories of how, historically, Hindu women
were abducted by Muslim men. They have been holding meetings, distributing
pamphlets, and even filing court cases against Muslim men alleged of luring Hindu
women to marry them. These right-wing groups have declared that ‘love-jihad,’ as
a part of an Islamist conspiracy, is a plan for the compulsive and deceitful religious
conversion of young women by winning over their love. To counter ‘love-jihad,’
Ajju Chauhan, state co-convenor of the Bajrang Dal, launched a campaign named
‘Bahu Laao, Beti Bachao’ 42 in February 2015. The campaign was meant to
encourage Hindu men to marry non-Hindu women and, on the other hand, to create
awareness among Hindu women against ‘love-jihad’.
The case of ‘love-jihad’ has been highlighted and has made its presence felt
in the visual as well as print media because of its “socio-religio-political movement
to protect religious sovereignty in India.” 43 Media platforms including social
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networking sites are flooded with the news of ‘love-jihad’ cases and that has
undoubtedly posed a threat to the expression of one’s choice of love and raised the
alarming question of being able to choose religious identity. There are several
campaigns such as ‘Moral Policing,’ ‘Ghar Wapsi,’ 44 ‘Bahu Lao, Beti Bachao,’
‘How to Save Our Women from the Terrorism of Love-Jihad,’ ‘Hindu Auraton ki
Loot’45 and ‘Love Trishul’46 which were launched to save the honour of Hindu
women and preserve cohesive community identities and boundaries.
‘Love-jihad’ also known as ‘Romeo-Jihad’ is considered as part of an
international Islamist conspiracy; it is alleged that young Muslim men receive funds
from abroad to purchase “designer clothes, vehicles, mobile phones and expensive
gifts to woo Hindu women and lure them away … from their home and religion.”47
Spreading such opinions through campaigns strengthens the pre-existing belief that
the “body of the Hindu woman has become a site for both claims to community
homogeneity and honour.”48 These campaigns also undermine the status of women
in India using the old patriarchal notion that women are not self-sufficient enough
to make their own decisions. Charu Gupta has mentioned noted Hindi writers such
as Bharatendu Harishchandra,

49

Pratap Narain Misra,

50

and Radha Charan

Goswami 51 to explain how these campaigns utilised the history of medieval
“Muslim rule, which is assumed as the history of chronicle rape and abduction of
Hindu women.”52 "The same assumption is carried forward that the Muslim men
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lack morality with high sexual appetites for women’s body, lecherous in behaviours
with a life of luxury and religious fanaticism.”53
Along with being used for creating panic and fostering hate to draw sharper
lines between Hindus and Muslims in India, it can be argued from the above
analysis that in the contemporary political scenario, women’s bodies have become
the battleground for playing the political card and spreading falsehood and hatred.
Women’s bodies are often being presumed as the repository of moral ethics. ‘Lovejihad’ appears to be a form of violence which attacks religion, gender, and the rights
of women. Furthermore, the concept of ‘love-jihad’ also tends to seize away the
right of a woman to choose a partner, while also enforcing religion-imposed choices
on the bride. Bollywood has always been a platform to represent the socio-political
situation, and, thus, it caters to the common psyche of the country. We must focus
on the impact of Hindu nationalism and the love-jihad campaign on Bollywood.

Locating ‘Love-Jihad’ in Bollywood
In the postcolonial nation state, films have become an important tool to
propagate the idea of nationalism. Hindi cinema went through varied shifts in
response to the socio-political situation of its contemporary times. While the films
of the 1950s and the 1960s, the so-called Nehruvian54 era, reflected the ‘tolerant’
secularism of the state, the 1970s and the 1980s saw the emergence of an alternative
politics of representing minority Muslims as ‘Other’ and Hindu culture as national
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culture. Though Muslims are always represented as ‘Others’ by portraying them as
exotic in Bollywood, which was the case even during the so-called secularist
Nehruvian era, the specific vilification of Muslims only started about three decades
ago. At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the Hindu right-wing
movement emerged as a robust presence in India. The Babri Masjid55 demolition
on 6 December 1992, and the concomitant hardening of communal identities was a
major turning point in recent Indian history. It was followed by communal riots in
many parts of India. The demolition of the Babri Masjid and the riots that followed
became the theme of many memorable films. The divisions in Indian society,
whether it is sexual, religious, or ethnic identity, have increasingly been more
apparent in recent years. But, ignoring that fact, Hindi cinema continues to
prioritize a monolithic image of the nation and portray a “certain essence of
‘Indianess’”56 termed as ‘Indian culture.’ Such representations are most popular
among the Indian diaspora. The diasporic communities have an important role in
forging public culture in India. According to Sunil Khilnani, towards the end of
1989, a large number of bricks57 were piled up in the pilgrimage town of Ayodhya
to build the Ram-temple at the disputed site of the erstwhile Babri Masjid. These
were not ordinary bricks; they were ‘Ram shilas’ or Ram’s bricks collected from
across India and outside the country. Khilnani points out, “Each was inscribed with
its place of origin, and among the most proudly displayed were those dispatched by
emigrant communities in United States, Canada, South Africa and [the]
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Caribbean.”58 The diasporic community provided an eager market for films that
cater to Hindu religion and culture. Two Bollywood films, Pardes 59 and Kabhi
Khushi Kabhi Gham60 narrate stories of Indian families transported to foreign lands
and promote Indian culture and rituals “identified as markers of Hindu tradition,
thereby making any other religion or culture appear ‘Un-Indian’.”61 I argue that if
there is a need to represent Hindu culture and tradition as a national culture, it is
obvious that others are represented as either less or differently. Muslims are
portrayed as ‘Others’ who are trying to harm the nation, while the majoritarian
community is often represented as the ‘victims.’ Hence, Hindus are projected as the
norm of the society and Muslims are the disrupters of this norm. The ‘Otherization’
of Muslims through cinematic space was mostly done during the last decade of the
20th and the first decade of the 21st century.
The deep-seated prejudices in India about Muslims were utilized by the
Hindutva movements to unite the majoritarian population. The strategy of
polarizing people was adopted keeping in mind the troubled history of the
subcontinent. Injecting a deep paranoia about Muslims and their ‘outsideness’ by
frequent references to medieval Muslim plunderers such as Mamud, the Sultan of
Gazni, who looted northern India every year, is a popular strategy of Hindutva
forces. Such scenarios were created by Hindu nationalists in a way that implied that
the crisis occurred recently.62 Prakash Louis, in his empirical study,63 discusses the
attempts of the RSS to ‘re-write’ history textbooks in Maharashtra, thereby
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injecting communal consciousness in the minds of the young. There was also a new
set of films that characterized family values, ‘Indian culture,’ and patriarchy but
had Muslim characters in minor or supporting roles who were identifiable because
of their Islamicate culture. In those films, such characters’ identities as Muslims
took precedence over all other identity markers such as occupation.
Postcolonial Hindi cinema became one of the platforms to propagate the
hegemony of the ‘Hindu-ized nation’ which emphasizes the notion of women being
the symbol of the country. Bollywood has also become a controversial site as some
film-makers are accused for disseminating the ideology of ‘love-jihad’ through
their films. Jodhaa Akbar is cited as the initial example of ‘love-jihad.’ Another
recent and targeted film that is claimed to have promoted ‘love-jihad’ is Bajrangi
Bhaijaan.

64

As soon as the name of the film was announced, it was wrongly

assumed by some unknown ‘Hindu fundamentalist’ groups that the film was an
example of ‘love-jihad’ where a Muslim boy wooed a Hindu girl. The whole
controversy started with the word bhaijaan which is generally used to address a
Muslim man. Actually, the plot concerns a Hindu Brahmin man who faces
numerous challenges to reunite a Pakistani Muslim girl with her homeland and
family. The film was mired in multiple controversies before its release.
In Gujarat, before the festival of garba,65 VHP leaders started circulating an
audio clip that targeted Bajrangi Bhaijaan in order to warn Hindus against ‘lovejihad.’ VHP leaders mentioned, “The audio was created to bring awareness among
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Hindus that such a sinister plan is being executed by the minority community to
entice young Hindu girls who get smitten by the romanticism in such movies.”66
They even claimed that the director, Kabir Khan, had been funded by Arab
countries to make the film to promote the ideology of ‘love-jihad.’ The most recent
and most targeted film claimed to promote ‘love-jihad’ is Sanjay Leela Bhansali’s
Padmaavat. In that film, Alauddin Khalji67 is depicted as a cannibalistic, sexually
depraved, and despotic ruler; this portrayal is a product of the recent socio-political
developments in the country, where the Muslim man is portrayed as an alien ‘Other’
out to violate a brave and virtuous Hindu woman’s ‘honour.’
Apart from the films, Bollywood stars, especially the Khans, are accused of
the charge of ‘love-jihad’ in their real lives. Saif Ali Khan even got death threats at
the time of his wedding to Kareena Kapoor in 2012 as he was accused for promoting
‘love-jihad.’ The Hindu Mahasabha has thrown a challenge to the Khans —
Shahrukh Khan, Amir Khan, and Saif Ali Khan — to be converted to Hinduism if
they really love their wives. Himalaya Dhwani, a women’s magazine by the VHP,
used a morphed photo of Kareena Kapoor for its cover page: her face is shown as
half covered with a niqab,68 with the caption “Conversion of nationality through
religious conversion.”69 The magazine carried an article that attempted to persuade
those women who got married to Muslim men to re-convert. As Kareena Kapoor
married a Muslim man, her picture was used as a tool to promote the campaign.
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Portrayal of Historical Female Characters as the Nation
In this section, I will discuss two female characters—Jodhaa 70 and
Padmaavati71—and their fictitious portrayal of history in Bollywood to support the
larger political discourse in present times, as many Indian filmgoers tend to get their
knowledge of history from such films. On the one hand, we have Jodhaa, a quasihistorical character about whom very few historical facts are available, who is
shown as trying to retain her Hindu religious beliefs and values even after her
marriage with Akbar, a Muslim ruler; on the other hand, we see Padmavati, a
fictitious character (also known as Rani Padmini) sacrificing her life in fear of
losing her honor at the hands of the Muslim ruler, Alauddin Khalji. Most
interestingly, the 19th century witnessed Rani Padmini’s existence in poetry being
transformed into a ‘fact.’ Colonial writer, Colonel James Tod, Political Agent of
the English East India Company in Rajputana, “manufactured the enduring
impression of Indian history as a confrontation between Muslims and Hindus —
which justified British rule to keep the peace in a land of competing antagonisms.”72
Later on, the legend of Rani Padmini aka Padmavati was used for anti-colonial
mobilization in the early 20th century. In Jodhaa Akbar, the Muslim emperor was
projected as an ideal example due to his tolerant ways as he willingly accepted
Jodhaa’s cultural superiority.
Jodhaa Akbar, a period drama, can claim to have a pioneering role in the
context of portraying communal harmony. The film narrates the story of the
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romance between Mughal Emperor Jalal-ud-din Muhammad Akbar and the Rajput
princess Jodhaa Bai, daughter of King Bharmal of Amer. When Akbar plans to
attack Amer, King Bharmal reluctantly offers his daughter’s hand in marriage to
the emperor himself to avoid war and strengthen relations between their kingdoms.
Akbar agrees to the marriage, as such a union would bring forge a truly strong
alliance and long-lasting peace between the Mughal Empire and the Rajputs.
Padmaavat is also a period drama. The film is inspired by the eponymous
epic poem by Malik Muhammad Jayasi. Rani Padmavati, a Rajput queen known
for her beauty, is the wife of Maharawal Ratan Singh. Sultan Alauddin Khalji hears
of the legendary beauty of Rani Padmavati and attacks Ratan Singh’s kingdom to
claim her. While the film Padmaavat not only portrays the Rajput queen as
symbolically representing the nation, the eruption of controversies associated with
the film before its release also shows how the female body is constructed as a site
of a community’s honour in the nationalist discourse. The film narrates the
transactions between Rajput kings and the Khaljis of the Delhi Sultanate. Several
Rajput-caste organizations, including Shri Rajput Karni Sena, protested the making
of the film. The film’s sets were also vandalized as the miscreants claimed that the
film portrays Padmavati, a Rajput queen, in bad light. It was assumed that there was
a song during which Khalji is shown fantasizing about the queen as an object for
his sexual desire. Even the film’s director, Sanjay Leela Banshali, was assaulted on
the film set. The protests were not limited to Rajasthan, where the Karni Sena and
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Rajuts were protesting; there were multiple protests that were organized across the
country. Bhansali and Deepika Padukone received death threats. A bounty of fifty
million rupees was announced for whoever would assassinate both. The beliefs and
psyche of the common people are evident from such protests. For them, the honor
of a Rajput queen and the nation’s honour are one and the same, representing
something that an outsider such as Khalji cannot be allowed to claim.
Both the queens have been represented as embodying the nation. Thus,
Jodhaa holds on to her duty and honor in adverse circumstances as the proud
embodiment of the nation when she is banished from Akbar’s kingdom on charges
of being disloyal towards her husband. She faces grave humiliation and shame
when she has to leave the country; however, she willingly returns to the emperor’s
palace after Akbar renounces the jaziya tax.73 Here love is an overarching concept
because Jhodhaa compromises her dignity and self-esteem for the general interest
of the larger society and nation. Film scholar Anustup Basu points out that “human
(heterosexual) love is a unifying middle term which sets up an organic bridge
between spirit and substance, between the particular and the general interest.”74 The
film portrays Jodhaa as a character imbued with zeal and self-assertion and makes
her as the active counter of Akbar. It is through her agency that the Oriental despot
Akbar turns pacifist at the end and seeks peace even with the evil and rebellious
Sharifuddin.
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As already discussed in the earlier sections, one of the important features of
the new-found Hindu nationalism is the construction of the image of ideal women
as virtuous, chaste, without sexual desire, self-sacrificing, and Hindu. To make the
image of women pure, Padmaavati is compared with the mythological characters
such as Savitri and her journey to bring back her husband from Yumraj.75 One of
the important characteristics of Jodhaa is her neutered sexlessness. Although
Mahamanga, the overassertive nurse of Akbar, taunts Jodhaa for her sexless,
transactional style marriage, Jodhaa, as the symbol of Hinduness, finds succour in
a marriage that is binding and complete, meriting full submission even if it remains
unconsummated.
Throughout the film, Jodhaa’s cultural superiority is reflected multiple
times, most specifically in her refusal to take recourse to Khula, the Islamic right
of a woman to divorce her husband, offered by Akbar on the wedding night.
Mubarki interprets it as “an act of defiance and an assertion of cultural superiority,
aimed at rebuking Akbar and his cultural ‘Otherness,’ for while Islam considers
marriage as a social contract between two consenting individuals, in Hinduism
marriage signifies a bond that transcends time and space. If Jodhaa must hang on
to her faith, Akbar must partially renounce his.”76 The film shows that Jodhaa may
cohabit with the ‘Other’ if her culturally visible ‘spiritual’ qualifiers such as her
dress, her culinary habits, her religiosity, and her samskar 77 are respected and
obeyed. Jodhaa emerges from the narrative as the protector of Hindu values in the
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midst of a cultural onslaught, and becomes the embodiment of national
consciousness. The character of Jodhaa dwells a middle ground and straddles the
dichotomous regions of the Mughal Empire as the outer domain and the spiritual as
an inner realm beyond the critiques of outsiders. In Padmaavat, the cultural
superiority of the Rajput queen is obvious in almost every scene. There are many
sequences such as greeting an enemy such as Khalji, culinary choices, and sartorial
choices that portray the rich cultural heritage of Hindu Rajputs and which
symbolize the entire nation’s culture. In this imaginary world of the Rajput
kingdom, Maharawal Ratan Singh gets the chance to kill Khalji but refuses to do
so because of his ethics and values of life as he believes that a guest should be
treated like a god and that is the practice of a true Rajput. Sartorial choices are also
highlighted multiple times through the elaborate costumes of the whole Rajput clan,
especially through the characters of Padmavati and Ratan Singh. One can even
argue that the lotus motif, which is omnipresent in the entire film from being in
costumes to wall paintings, symbolizes the current ruling political party of India.78
Vegetarian food is also treated as a source of pride and this is evident when Khalji
is offered such a meal.
That the nation’s pride lies in the hands of women is most evident through
the glorification of the ritual of mass suicide, which is termed jauhar. Though
Khalji’s army succeeds in defeating the Rajputs and capturing Chittor, it is unable
to capture the Rajput women, who commit jauhar with Rani Padmavati. It
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fundamentally propagates the message that the honour of the community or clan
rests with women. If the woman cohabits with an outsider, the community’s and
thus the nation’s integrity and pride are lost. It also inspires women to sacrifice their
lives if they face similar situations to save the nation’s pride, encouraging them to
see things from the perspective of the community’s larger interest rather than their
own individualistic interest. Padmavati emerges within the narrative as a protector
of Hindu values. Padmavati inspires other women to commit jauhar and in her
speech she says, “In every age, a war for righteousness is fought between good and
evil. Like the one between Lord Ram and Raavan, between the Pandavas and
Kauravas and now between the Rajputs and Khiljis.” To encourage other women
to sacrifice their lives, Padmaavi further says in her concluding speech, “Those who
lust for our body, would not even get their hands on our shadows, our bodies will
be reduced to ashes, but our pride and honour will remain immortal, and that will
be the biggest defeat of Alauddin’s life.”
The transaction between Jodhaa and Akbar is not characterized by any
“Bakhtinian style of interactive, responsive nature of dialogue, or a mutual
exchange of cultural practices.”79 It is very evident that the film encourages a oneway acknowledgement that requires Akbar to adapt to the customs of Jodhaa, much
like the right-wing rhetoric that requires minorities to adopt the majoritarian80 way
of life. In connection to this, Tejaswini Niranjana examines the reasons why the
film Bombay81 could not have had a Muslim male cohabiting with a Hindu female,
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given the metaphorical association of women with the motherland: “the initiator of
the integration process … cannot but be a man from the majority community.”82
The films which narrate the story of inter-religious marriage of a Hindu female with
a Muslim male marks her symbolic alienation from land, faith, family, and
motherland, as in Pinjar,83 Kurbaan,84 and My Name Is Khan.85

Representation of Muslim Rulers as ‘Other’ in the Context of ‘Love-jihad’
The films Jodhaa Akbar and Padmaavat are in the genre of ‘Muslim
Historical’ which is characterised by its exoticisms of ‘Other.’ With regard to the
Muslim Historical genre, Ira Bhaskar and Richard Alan indicate that “in the postindependence Nehruvian period, this rhetoric had a special significance in
upholding the Mughal era and as a valuation of Muslim culture that marked the
secular credentials of the new nation-state.”86 In the context of the current political
scenario, we find that contemporary Muslim Historical films present a different
rhetoric than in the past. The primary factors of inspiration for the storylines and
character development in the two films under our review in this paper are ‘Islamic
Empires,’ specifically the Mughal rulers, and imagined love affairs. Jodhaa Akbar
represents Mughal emperors as rulers who were known to be cultured, secular, and
popular for their good governance and also portrays a generalized imagination of
Islamicate culture, architecture, etc. It emphasizes the Muslim ethos, which is
basically north Indian culture.87 In the film, the exoticism of Akbar is characterized
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by the predominant cultural elements of language, dress, and music, which were
clearly influenced by Islamicate culture.
Muslim Historical films employ Urdu as the standard language of the
Mughal rulers, and Jodhaa Akbar as well as Padmaavat make use of the language
in the context of Muslim rulers. After Partition, Urdu has come to be designated as
the language of Muslims, as it became the national language of Pakistan; also, Urdu
was considered “as a ‘Muslim language’ due to its association with Muslim courts
and its close ties with Persian language and literature.” 88 Because of political
reasons, Hindi came to be considered as the de facto national language of India. It
was assumed that Urdu implies Muslim and Pakistan, and Hindi implies Hindu and
Hindustan. But these Hindi films used the Urdu language as that belonging to the
Mughal rulers to signify the existence of these historical figures beyond the nation
state and mark them as the outsiders to or intruders of this country.
Islamicate culture is reflected in these films through the costumes of the
characters. Jodhaa Akbar and Padmaavat represent the splendour of the royal
courts through architecture and costumes. Jodhaa Akbar displays elaborate
costumes much like other Muslim Historical films. In Padmaavat, Rawal Ratan
Singh’s character as the brave and noble Indian Rajput king is reflected through the
extravagance of his costumes that befit the Rajput glory he is shown as upholding.
On the other hand, ambitious and obsessive Alauddin Khalji is attributed a dark and
ominous look because of his background as a nomadic Turkish tribal invader. His

Published by DigitalCommons@UNO, 2018

25

Journal of Religion & Film, Vol. 22 [2018], Iss. 3, Art. 8

character became a perfect counterfoil to Rawal Ratan Singh through the use of
dark-coloured costumes, by being surrounded by women all the time, and due to
his excessive appetite for meat.
Though Jodhaa Akbar portrays the picture of Akbar as a secular ruler, he
only becomes fully Indian by privileging the nation over faith within the narrative
of the film. Jodhaa Akbar uses the strategy of the ideology of syncretism as “Akbar
is shorn of all oppositional elements: the proverbial Mughal bloodlust, the famed
Muslim propensity for violence, and the forbidden pleasures of the flesh.”89 He is
subsumed into the nationalist order, and being nationalist, he indulges himself with
the virtues of eating vegetarian food and practising monogamy and pacifism.
Though he is also represented as the ‘Other’ through his costume and language:
“his Otherness is rendered safe and assimilable, and secularism emerges from
within the vortex of Hindutva – softer, but all-encompassing nevertheless.”90
The representation of Khalji as the outsider is absolute in Padmaavat as he
is shown asserting his connection with and tracing his ancestry to Afghanistan. To
drive home the point even further, the film begins with a shot of a fort in the middle
of a desert and the mise-en-scene of the world inside the fort represents the lifestyle
of Alauddin's paternal uncle and the founder of the Khalji dynasty, Sultan
Jalaluddin Khalji. He is shown as nonchalantly relaxing in the midst of a huge heap
of meat, and is being chastised by his fellow mates because of his excesses. The
film pits the great, brave, and virtuous Hindus versus the depraved and despotic
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Muslim Khalji, who has an insatiable appetite for meat and women. Despite being
an iconoclast and an expansionist, Khalji was a sophisticated speaker of Persian,
who streamlined the economy of the Delhi Sultanate and is credited with having
been the patron of the invention of two key instruments of Hindustani classical
music, the tabla and the sitar. But the film never focuses on these positive aspects.
Khalji is reduced to being the perfect example of cannibalistic, sexually depraved,
and despotic Muslims.

Conclusion
Popular culture has always developed in response to a country’s political
situation. The production of a self-conscious and aggressive nationalism in Hindi
cinema recalls the idea of saving the nation by protecting the female body from
invaders or the ‘Other.’ As the ‘love-jihad’ campaign considers women as the
nation’s pride and the male members of the society as protectors of that honour, the
same ideology finds reflection in Bollywood as well, which is often used as a
platform to propagate contemporary political discourse. Popular culture through
films such as Padmaavat encourage women to uphold their honour even if it means
sacrificing their life to avoid being captured by the ‘Outsider.’ On the other hand
Jodhaa Akbar represents a one-sided assimilation of Muslim culture into Hindu
practices and showcased the cultural superiority of Hinduism. Most interestingly,
in both the films, the spiritual sphere, which was represented by women, was
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protected from the ‘Others’ who happened to be ‘outsiders’ as well, sometimes by
portraying them as inferior or by vilifying the characters. This phenomenon echoes
features of Orientalist discourse, which depicted Western culture as superior to
Eastern ones,91 specifically, that of Muslims in the Middle-East. By analysing these
two films, we can infer that Bollywood has created a space for popular historical
perceptions which have been developed through a complicated process of
interaction between academic history writing and political ideology. The
dissemination of potentially distorted or fictitious representation of history through
popular culture is strengthening Hindu nationalist discourse, and by doing so, it is
also re-emphasising the narrative of how women can save the honor of our society
from outsiders, much in the same way as the concept of ‘love-jihad’ argues. We
find that Bollywood has contributed to the hegemonic Hindutva discourse through
multiple representations of the concept of the Hindu nation and Muslim minority
as a kind of Manichean rivalry.

The definition of Bollywood is mentioned by the editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica as “Hindilanguage sector of the Indian moviemaking industry that began in Bombay (now Mumbai) in the
1930s and developed into an enormous film empire.” - “Bollywood.” Encyclopaedia Britannica.
Last modified October 12, 2018. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Bollywood-film-industryIndia.
1

2

As per the definition by Encyclopaedia Britannica, Hindi is a standardised and Sanskritised
register of the Indic languages. Hindi is written in the Devanagari script. Hindi, along with
English, is the official language of India. - “Hindi Language.” Encyclopaedia Britannica. Last
modified November 28, 2018. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hindi-language.
Love Jihad (sometimes referred as Romeo Jihad) is mentioned by Charu Gupta as “fake claim
by the Hindu right that there is a ‘Love Jihad’ organization which is forcing Hindu women to

3

https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/jrf/vol22/iss3/8

28

Khatun: ‘Love-Jihad’ and Bollywood: Constructing Muslims as ‘Other’

convert to Islam through false expressions of love.” – Charu Gupta, “Hindu Women, Muslim
Men: Love Jihad and Conversions” in Economic and political weekly 44:51 (December 2009), 13.
4

Jodhaa Akbar is a Hindi language film, released in 2008, and directed by Ashutosh Gowariker.

5

Padmaavat is a Hindi language film, released in 2018, and directed by Sanjay Leela Bhansali.

6

Kelly J. Bell, "Who Makes a Nation? An Examination of Nationalism, Gender, and Membership
in the Nation." Inquiries Journal/Student Pulse 1.12 (2009). Accessed September 16, 2018.
http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=80.
Merriam-Webster. “Nationalism: dictionary definition,” accessed August 8, 2018.
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationalism.
7

8

See footnote 6.

Sophie Gilmartin mentioned 'Sati-daha' as “the obsolete Hindu practice in which a widow burns
herself upon her husband’s funeral pyre” - Gilmartin, Sophie. “The Sati, the Bride, and the
Widow: Sacrificial Woman in the Nineteenth Century,” In Victorian Literature and Culture 25:1
(1997), 141. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1060150300004678.
9

Lata Mani cited in Partha Chatterjee, “Colonialism, Nationalism, and Colonialized Women: The
Contest in India.” In American Ethnologist 16:4 (1989): 622-633.
10

11

Chatterjee, “Colonialism, Nationalism, and Colonialized Women,” 622-633.

Syed Hussain Shaheed Sowerwordi, “Hindu Nationalism and the Political Role of Hindu
Women: Ideology as a Factor.” In South Asian Studies 28:1 (June 2013), 41.
12

Sarkar, T. “The Gender Predicament of the Hindu Right.” In The Concerned Indian’s Guide to
Communalism, edited by K. N. Panikkar. New Delhi: Penguin Book India. (2003): 131–159.
13

14

Bell, "Who Makes a Nation?”

15

Soherwordi, “Hindu Nationalism and the Political Role of Hindu Women,” 39-54.

16

See footnote 12.

17

Anustap Basu, Bollywood in the Age of New Media. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2010) cited in Soherwordi, “Hindu Nationalism and the Political Role of Hindu Women,” 40.
18

Thapar, Romila, et al., On Nationalism. (New Delhi: Aleph Spotlight, 2016).

Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), “presents itself as a cultural, not a political, organization
that nevertheless advocates a Hindu nationalistic agenda under the banner of hindutva, or ‘Hinduness’.” - “Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh.” Encyclopaedia Britannica. Last modified July 03,
2018. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Rashtriya-Swayamsevak-Sangh.
19

Nadira Khatun, “Imagining Muslims as the ‘Other’ in Muslim political films.” In Journal of
Arab & Muslim Media Research 9, 1 (April 2016): 41–60. https://doi:10.1386/jammr.9.1.41_1.
20

Published by DigitalCommons@UNO, 2018

29

Journal of Religion & Film, Vol. 22 [2018], Iss. 3, Art. 8

Ayodhya Movement: “[On December 6, 1992] right-wing Hindu mobs razed to the ground the
16th Century Babri mosque, claiming that it was built on the site of a temple destroyed by Muslim
rulers… It was the culmination of a six-year campaign [mentioned as Ayodhya Movement]
spearheaded by the BJP to destroy the mosque and replace it with a temple.” – Tully, Mark. “How
the Babri mosque destruction shaped India.” BBC News, December 6, 2017.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-42219773.
21

Sati (or Suttee) is mentioned as “the Indian custom of a wife immolating herself either on the
funeral pyre of her dead husband or in some other fashion soon after his death.” - “Suttee”
Encyclopaedia Britannica. Last modified March 03, 2015.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/suttee.
22

Sati of Roop Kanwar: “On September 4, 1987, … a young girl of 18 in the village of Deorala in
Rajasthan was murdered. She was burnt alive on the funeral pyre of her husband. Yet, according
to local tradition, Roop Kanwar had become a “sati” and had “voluntarily” immolated herself” –
Sharma, Kalpana. “Remembering Roop Kanwar.” The Hindu, September 23, 2007.
https://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-features/tp-sundaymagazine/remembering-roopkanwar/article2275587.ece.
23

24

Soherwordi, “Hindu Nationalism and the Political Role of Hindu Women,” 43.

25

Basu cited in Soherwordi, “Hindu Nationalism and the Political Role of Hindu Women,” 44.

Sita, is the central character in the Hindu epic, the Ramayana and “the consort of the god
Rama… Sita worshipped as the incarnation of Lakshmi… Though often regarded as the
embodiment of wifely devotion and self-sacrifice…” – “Sita” Encyclopaedia Britannica. Last
modified March 29, 2018. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sita.
26

Ashis Nandy, “Woman versus Womanliness in India: An Essay in Cultural and Political
Psychology.” In At the Edge of Psychology: Essays in Politics and Culture, New Delhi: Oxford
University Press. (1980): 32–46.
27

28

See footnote 11.

Sumathi Ramaswamy, “Maps, Mother/Goddesses, and Martyrdom in Modern India.” The
Journal of Asian Studies 67, 3 (August 2008): 819–853.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021911808001174.
29

30

Gupta, “Hindu Women, Muslim Men.”

Meraj Ahmed Mubarki, “Exploring the ‘Other’: inter-faith marriages in Jodhaa Akbar and
beyond,” In Contemporary South Asia 22, 3 (July 2014): 258.
https://doi:10.1080/09584935.2014.930419.
31

32

Sarkar, “The Gender Predicament of the Hindu Right,” 131–159.

'Bharat Maa', the symbolic name, is attributed to Mother India by freedom fighter during India’s
independence movement. –Bhardwaj, Ashutosh. “Bharat Mata: From freedom struggle metaphor
to patriotism’s litmus test.” The Indian Express, March 21, 2016.
33

https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/jrf/vol22/iss3/8

30

Khatun: ‘Love-Jihad’ and Bollywood: Constructing Muslims as ‘Other’

https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/in-fact-bharat-mata-from-freedom-struggle-metaphorto-patriotisms-litmus-test/.
Sumathi Ramaswamy, “Maps and Mother Goddesses in Modern India.” Imago Mundi 53, 1
(2001): 97–114. https://doi.org/10.1080/03085690108592940.
34

35

Sati referred as the goddess of marital felicity and longevity in Hinduism.

Savitri is mentioned as “goddess in Hindu mythology… The Mahabharata [Indian epic]
recounts how Savitri used the power of her dedication to her husband Satyavan to prevent Yama,
the god of the dead, from taking him when he was fated to die. She became the epitome of the
faithful wife.” - “Savitri.” Encyclopaedia Britannica. Last modified May 01, 2015.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Savitri.
36

37

Gupta cited in Mubarki, “Exploring the ‘Other’,” 259.

38

Charu Gupta, Sexuality, Obscenity, Community: Women, Muslims and the Hindu Public in
Colonial India. (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2001), 40.
39

Mubarki, “Exploring the ‘Other’,” 259.

40

See footnote 39.

41

Gupta, “Hindu Women, Muslim Men,” 13.

‘Bahu Laao, Beti Bachao’, the campaign, propagates the idea of bring more ‘daughters-in-law
from other religious communities and save Hindu daughters. - HT Correspondence. Hindustan
Times, December 01, 2017. https://www.hindustantimes.com/lucknow/hindu-outfit-plans-betibachao-bahu-lao-campaign-to-counter-love-jihad/story-HVxTzT8Vn8bAYmYNYVZysI.html.
42

Hossain, Sahel Md Delabul, et al. “‘Love-Jihad’; Protection of Religious Proximity: An Indian
Situation.” International Journal Of Humanities And Cultural Studies 2:4 (March 2016).
43

‘Ghar Wapsi’, meaning "Back to Home’, is a series of religious conversion activities, facilitated
by Indian Hindu organizations Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
(RSS), to facilitate conversion of non-Hindus to Hinduism. – PTI. “VHP announces 'ghar wapsi'
programme in Rajasthan.” The Ecomonic Times, December 24, 2014.
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/vhp-announces-ghar-wapsiprogramme-in-rajasthan/articleshow/45631386.cms.
44

‘Hindu Auraton ki Loot’, the campaign literally means ‘Loot of Hindu Women’. – Gupta,
Charu. “The myth of love jihad.” The Indian Express, August 28, 2014.
https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/the-myth-of-love-jihad/.
45

Love Trisul: Shiv-Sena, a Hindu right-wing political party of India, declared that the “party
would form a ‘love trishul’, gang of people meant to act and intervene early each time a case of
‘love jihad’ is reported, so that young Hindu women at risk of conversion after being trapped in
relationships are saved.” – Yadav, Ankit. “Shiv Sena forms ‘love trishul’ counter ‘love jihad’.”
The Times of India, September 8, 2014. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bareilly/ShivSena-forms-love-trishul-to-counter-love-jihad/articleshow/42050534.cms.
46

Published by DigitalCommons@UNO, 2018

31

Journal of Religion & Film, Vol. 22 [2018], Iss. 3, Art. 8

47

Gupta, “Hindu Women, Muslim Men,” 13.

48

Ibid.

Bhartendu Harishchandra (1850 – 1885) is known for his contribution as a writer in modern
Hindi literature as well as Hindi theatre.
49

50

Pratap Narain Misra (1856–1894) was a Hindi essayist in British India.

51

Radha Charan Goswami (1859–1923 was a Hindi writer.

52

Gupta, “Hindu Women, Muslim Men.”

53

Hossain, et al. “‘Love-Jihad’; Protection of Religious Proximity,” 673.

54

Jawaharlal Nehru was the first Prime Minister of India and is considered to be the architect of
the modern Indian nation-state: a sovereign, socialist, secular, and democratic republic. His office
period from 1947 to 1964 is considered the Nehruvian era.
Babri Masjid: “The substantial 16th century mosque was constructed in 1527 by Babur, the first
Mughal emperor of India… Babri Mosque was also at the heart of the Ayodhya dispute, a
contentious debate in India over access to the plot of land on which the Babri Mosque is built.
Muslims revere this land as the location of one of India’s oldest, grandest Mughal-era mosques
ever built. Hindus also regard the land as holy, as they believe it is the birthplace of the Hindu god
Rama… in 1992, during a political rally gone wrong, Hindu militants demolished the sacred Babri
Mosque…” – “Babri mosque is destroyed, incites riots.” The History Channel,
https://www.historychannel.com.au/this-day-in-history/babri-mosque-is-destroyed-incites-riots/.
55

Shobha S. Rajgopal, “Bollywood and Neonationalism: The emergence of Nativism as the Norm
in Indian conventional cinema.” In South Asian Popular culture 9:3 (October 2011), 240.
56

According to Khilnani, the number of bricks accumulated to build Ram Mandir was 167,000. –
Sunil Khilnani, The Idea of India (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2004).
57

58

Khilnani, The Idea of India, 150.

59

Pardes is a Hindi language film, released in 1997 and directed by Subhas Ghai.

60

Kabhi Khushi Kabhi Gham is a Hindi language film, released in 2001, directed by Karan Johar.

61

Rajgopal, “Bollywood and Neonationalism,” 242.

62

Rajgopal, “Bollywood and Neonationalism,” 237-246.

63

Prakash Louis, The Emerging Hindutva Force: The Ascent of Hindu Nationalism (New Delhi:
Indian Social Institute, 2000).

https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/jrf/vol22/iss3/8

32

Khatun: ‘Love-Jihad’ and Bollywood: Constructing Muslims as ‘Other’

64
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